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1
JURISDICTION STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to U.C.A.
§78-2a-3(2)(e), inasmuch as it is an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case, not
involving a first degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was tlie State obligated under U.C.A. §77-32-302 to provide the Defendant
with an accountant to assist in his defense at State expense? Questions of statutory
interpretation are subject to a correction of error standard, according no particular
deference to tlie tiial court. State v. Burns. 4 P.3d 795, 798, 2000 UT 56. Record 101.
2. Did tlie tiial court abuse its discretion under U.C.A. §77-8a-l by refusing to
sever the trials of tlie two charges? An appellate "will reverse a conviction only if the trial
judge's refusal to sever charges is a clear abuse of discretion in that it sacrifices tlie
defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial." State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah
App. 1990). Record 184-188.
3. Was the Defendant denied a fair trial due to manifest bias on the part of the trial
judge? Defendant did not specifically move to disqualify the trial judge under Rule 29(c)
of tlie Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor otherwise specifically object to the judges
behavior, but objects on the basis of plain error. "To establish plain error, a defendant
must demonstrate that c(i) an eiror exists; (ii) the eiror should have been obvious to the
tiial court; and (iii) the is harmful, i.e., absent the eiror, there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for tlie defendant, or pin ased differently, our confidence in the
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verdict is undermined." State v. Beck, 136 P.3d 1288, 1291, 2006 UT App 177.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U.C.A. §76-7-201
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a
child, or children under the age of18 years, he knowingly fails to provide
for the support of the spouse, cliild, or children when any one of them:
(a) is in needy circumstances; or
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received
from a source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's
behalf.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a
class A misdemeanor.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor:
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual
months within any 24-month period, or the total airearage is in
excess of $10,000.
(5)
(a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this
section, it is an affirmative defense that the accused is unable to
provide support. Voluntary unemployment or underemployment by
the defendant does not give rise to that defense.
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file
and serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his
intention to claim the affirmative defense of inability to provide
support. The notice shall specifically identity the factual basis for the
defense and the names and addresses of the witnesses who the
defendant proposes to examine in order to establish the defense.
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice
described in Subsection (5)(b), or at such other time as the court may
direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve the defendant
with a notice containing the names and addresses of the witnesses
who the state proposes to examine in order to contradict or rebut the
defendant's claim.
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U.C.A. §77-8a-l(4)(a)

(Quoted in brief)

U.C.A. §77-32-302

(Quoted in brief)

U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)

(Quoted in brief)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 29, 2004, the State filed an Information charging Tren Horrocks with two
counts of Criminal nonsupport under U.C.A. §76-7-201. Both counts were charged as
Third Degree felonies under Subsection (3)(c). On March 7, 2006, Mr. Horrocks filed a
motion requesting the State to provide funds so that he could hire an accountant to assist
in his defense. This motion was denied by the trial court on March 31, 2006. See Addendum A. On April 27, 2006, Mr. Horrocks moved to sever the charges on the two separate
counts. This motion was denied on May 23, 2006. See Addendum B. On May 9, 2006,
Mr. Horrocks filed notice under U.C.A. §76-7-20 l(5)(b) of his intent to claim the affirmative defense of inability to pay. Trial was held on June 5 and 6, 2006. The jury was
instructed as to both felony and the lesser included offense of misdemeanor criminal
nonsupport. The jury returned guilty verdicts of felonies on both counts. On August 22,
2006, Mr. Horrocks was sentenced to 10 years probation, ordered to serve 120 days in the
Uintah County Jail, and ordered to pay $457 per month toward ongoing child support and
$543 per month toward an arrearage of $53,017.40. This appeal was filed the same day.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. Horrocks divorced Teresa Ann Warden on or about May 22, 1990. He and
Ms. Warden had two children: Jillyn Eugenia Horrocks, born May 4, 1987, and Kelsey
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Maureen Horroeks, bom September 23, 1988.
2. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Mr. Hoiroeks was ordered to pay child support.
The amount of child support ordered was subsequently altered to reflect changes in
circumstances.
3. The State of Utah alleged in Count I that Mr. Horroeks committed the offense of
criminal non-support by knowingly failing to provide child support to Ms. Warden on
behalf of JiUyn and Kelsey in each of eighteen months witliin a twenty-four month period
or owed a total arrearage in excess of $10,000 during the period between August 1, 1997,
and July 12, 2004.
4. After Mr. Hoiroeks divorced from Ms. Warden, he married Maria Louise
Pincock. They divorced September 27, 1994, subsequently remarried, and divorced again
on May 11, 1998. Two children were bom to this marriage: Ashley Louise Horroeks,
bom July 10, 1991, and deceased July 6, 2000, and Allie Brianne Hoiroeks, bom January
12, 1996.
5. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Mr. Horroeks was ordered to pay child support.
The amount of child support ordered was subsequently altered to reflect changes in
circumstances.
6. The State of Utah alleged in Count II that Mr. Horroeks committed the offense
of criminal non-support by knowingly failing to provide child support to Ms. Pincoek on
behalf of Ashley and Allie in each of eigliteen months within a twenty-four month period
or owed a total arrearage in excess of $10,000 during the period between October 1,

5
1998, and June 1, 2004.
7. During a part of the period for which the State alleged an arrearage, Jillyn and
Kelsey lived with Mr. Horrocks. Ms. Warden paid no child support during this time.
8. In September, 1994, Mr. Horrocks was injured in an industrial accident and
burned over 60% of his body.
9. Is is Mr. Horrocks' position that he was unable to pay child support due to his
reduced earning ability in consequence of his injuries.
10. The evidence demonstrated that there were discrepancies between the State's
accounting and Mr. Horrocks' calculation of amounts owed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. By the same token that Mr. Horrocks qualified for the appointment of counsel,
he also qualified for the hiring of an expert witness at the State's expense. The trial court
applied inappropriate criteria in denying Mr. Horrocks' request for funds to hire and
expert witness.
2. Trials on separate charges should be severed when the evidence on one charge
would tend to prejudice the jury on the other, and the evidence on the separate charges
would not otherwise be admissable in the separate trials. Mr. Horrocks was prejudiced
when the trial court denied his motion to sever.
3. The trial judge displayed a consistent bias against Mr. Horrocks, causing him to
deny numerous valid motions as if Mr. Horrocks' conviction was already a foregone
conclusion. This bias is manifest from the record, and thus constitutes plain error.
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ARGUMENT
I. As an indigent defendant, Mr. Horrocks was denied adequate resources to prepare
his defense.
The bulk of the State's evidence against Mr. Horrocks consisted of account
statements compiled by the Office of Recovery Services. The accuracy of those accounts
was thus a critical element in the State's case. In particular, the State alleged that an
arrearage already existed at the beginning of the period for which Mr. Horrocks was
being charged, while Mr. Horrocks maintained that the accounts should have shown a
surplus.
U.C.A. §77-32-302(1) states:
Legal counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent and the
indigent shall also be provided with access to defense resources necessary
for an effective defense, if the indigent is under arrest for or charged with a
crime in wrhich there is a substantial probability that the penalty to be
imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if:
(a) the indigent requests counsel or defense resources, or both; or
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise orders counsel, defense
resources, or both and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject
on the record the opportunity to be represented and provided defense
resources.
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in pertinent part:
Upon showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees
of an expert whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness
fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of the prosecution.
"It follows, therefore, that the only requirements for receiving public assistance for
expert witnesses are proof of necessity and establishment of indigence." State v. Bums. 4
P.3d 795, 801, 2000 UT 56. There is no question that accounting records were an essen-
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tial element in the State's case, and there is no question that Mr. Horrocks was indigent.
However, the trial judge wrent a step further and made his own determination as to the
validity of the State's accounts, deciding, without the assistance of an accountant, that the
statements were valid, and effectively preventing Mr. Horrocks from challenging the
accounts at all. Denial of an expert to an indigent defendant is sufficient grounds to
reverse a conviction if "the error is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more favorable result
for the defendant." State v. Bums. 4 P.3d at 802. In this case, a rigorous examination of
the State's accounts could have meant the difference between a felony and a
misdemeanor. A sufficient discrepancy in the accounts might have undermined the State's
credibility entirely. Mr. Horrocks was denied this resource for his defense when the trial
judge took upon himself the role of accountant. He was thus prejudiced, and the
convictions should be reversed.
n. Mr. Horrocks was prejudiced by being prosecuted for two unrelated offences in
one trial.
U.C.A. §77-8a-l states in pertinent part:
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in
the same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if
the offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected
together in their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.
(4)(a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced
by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by
a joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials
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of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief
as justice requires.
Subsections (1) and (2) require a two-part analysis. The court must determine,
first, whether the counts were connected together in their commission or were alleged to
be part of a common scheme or plan, and second, even if the counts are so connected,
whether the defendant would be prejudiced by trying them together. State v. Scales. 946
P.2d 377, 385 (Utah App. 1997).
The trial court applied a flawed analysis to the first part, and completely failed to
consider the factors governing prejudice. The sole connection the State alleged between
the two counts was that Mr. Horrocks committed the same offense with regard to two
different victims, and that he committed the offenses during overlapping time periods. No
other connection between the two counts was alleged. The State also argued that the
counts constituted part of a common scheme or plan, but offered no evidence of any
scheme or plan, other than to repeat the similarity of the offenses and their proximity in
time. In fact, Mr. Horrocks was merely charged with crimes of omission. A common
scheme or plan is in itself an act of commission. The trial court abused its discretion in
finding a sufficient link to justify a single trial.
Subsection (4)(a) leaves no room for discretion. If the court finds that a defendant
wrould be prejudiced by a single trial "the court shall order an election of separate trials."
(Emphasis added). "The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is prejudiced by
joinder is whether evidence of the other crime would have been admissable in a separate
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trial." State v.Meade. 27 P.3d 1115, 1130 (Utah 2001). Very simply, it could not. There
is no aspect of Count I that the State could have introduced in a trial of Count II, and
there is no evidence of Count II that the State could have introduced in a trial of Count I.
The debt allegedly owed to Ms. Warden had nothing to do with the debt allegedly owed
to Ms. Pincock, and vice versa. Proximity in time or nature of the offenses was not an
element supporting either count, and thus could serve no other purpose than to prejudice
the trial in favor of the prosecution.
The State apparently attempted to avoid this obvious disparity by confusing
identical witnesses with identical evidence. While the same witness might have testified
as to the State's accounting in both trials, that witness certainly could not have testified
about Ms. Pincock's account in the trial regarding Ms. Warden's account, and vice versa.
Certainly neither Ms. Warden nor Ms. Pincock themselves could have testified as to the
other ex-wife's account. Nor did the State ever identify what identical evidence it
intended to introduce in two separate trials. It is clear that it could not.
In short, even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion under U.C.A. §77-8a-l,
Subsection (1), it nevertheless entirely failed to apply the appropriate mandatory criteria
under Subsection (4)(a). "[E]rror is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would been a more favorable result for the
defendant." State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 361 (Utah 1993), or, in other words, "our
confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Casey, 82 P.3d 1106, 2003 UT 55, f U .
By trying both counts together, each count was reinforced by evidence that would have
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been entirely inadmissable in separate trials, and thus was purely inflammatory for the
purpose of the trial at hand. Mr. Horrocks was prejudiced by a joint trial, and the
convictions should therefore be reversed.
III. Mr. Horrocks was prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge.
In the course of the proceedings, it became apparent that the trial judge had a bias
against Mr. Horrocks. Normally, a party alleging bias must make a motion to disqualify
under Rule 29(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure within 20 days of discovering
the bias. However, when this bias becomes apparent through a cumulative series of
slanted rulings, it is often difficult to say with precision exactly when the bias became
apparent, thus rendering it difficult to comply with the strict requirements of Rule 29(c).
Nevertheless, bias on the part of a trial judge sufficient to prejudice the proceedings is
readily susceptible to a plain error analysis.
"To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that '(i) an error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the is harmful, i.e., absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant,
or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Beck. 136
P.3d 1288, 1291, 2006 UT App 177.
The pattern of bias emerges not only from the two pretrial Rulings, Record 101,
184-188, but from the conduct of the trial. Record 425, pp. 5-12, 34-37, 39-41, 182-183,
213, 219, 262-263, and 272-285, and Record 426, pp. 389, 449 and 453. It appears that a
predisposition in favor of the prosecution tainted all of the proceedings and effectively
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prevented Mr. Horrocks from obtaining the defense resources he needed, as well as from
presenting his full theory of defense in a non-cumulative forum.
CONCLUSION
Without an accountant, Mr. Horrocks was denied the opportunity to adequately
defend himself. He was also prejudiced by having both counts tried together, and by bias
on the part of the trial judge. His convictions should therefore be reversed.
DATED this 21st day of May, 2007.

Michael L. Humiston
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants were
mailed to the following this 21st day of May, 2007:
Utah Attorney General
Appellate Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Michael L. Humiston

ADDENDUM A

/

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

RULING

:

vs.

:

TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,

:

Defendant.

:

Case No.: 041800326

The Defendant's Request to Appoint an Accountant is denied. The request does not
demonstrate how an accountant would assist the Defendant in his defense. The records of the
State appear to be kept on a computer with no back-up documents to review for accuracy other
than the Defendant's own records. The State has agreed to give the Defendant credit for any
payments he has made when he has proof of payment. This record keeping does not require the
skills of an accountant.
DATED this $0

day of March, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PAYNff DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the -J/ y day of March, 2006, true and correct copies of the
Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Ms Ann Rozycki, Assistant Attorney
General, at P.O. Box 140814, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0814 and to Mr. Bryan Sidwell,
Attorney for Defendant, at 134 W. Main, Suite 202, Vernal, UT 84078.
-UJAJL/

Deputy Clerl

ADDENDUM B

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
RULING
Plaintiff,
vs.
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,

CASE NO. 041800326
JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's "Motion
to Sever Charges," filed with the Court on April 27, 2006, and
accompanied by supporting memorandum. The State's response to
the Defendant's motion was filed on May 02, 2006. The Court,
having reviewed the motion, now enters the following ruling on
the motion.
This case involves two third-degree felony charges against
the Defendant for failure to support his children from two separate marriages. "A court should sever charges when it concludes
that prejudice to the defendant outweighs considerations of
economy and practicalities of judicial administration, with
doubts being resolved in favor of severance." State v. Smith,
927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996).
Count One alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to
support his children, Jillyn and Kelsey, from August 1997
through July 2004. Count Two alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to support his children, Ashley and Allie, from October 1998 through July 2004. The two sets of the Defendant's
children result from different marriages. The Defendant has
filed a motion to sever the charges, arguing that in the present
case the two counts are not connected in that there are separate

victims from each alleged count. The Defendant also argues that
there is no common scheme between the alleged counts. The State
argues that "since these charges cover approximately the same
time periods, it is the State's position that Defendant committed both criminal counts with the common scheme or plan to pay
little or no child support for any of his children." State's
Response, pg.3.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (2006) governs this this area of
law. State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 n.8 (Utah 1993). The
relevant section of the Utah Code states:
Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged
in the same indictment or information if each offense is a
separate count and if the offenses charged are: (a) based
on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in
their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a
common scheme or plan.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (2006). In this case, each of the
offenses brought against the Defendant are separate counts, alleged to be part of a common scheme or plan (to avoid paying
child support for his children). In State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114
(Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed what was
required in order to establish a "common scheme or plan" under
this statute.
The Lee court first identified that Utah appellate courts
had not yet interpreted that language under this statute. Lee,
831 P,2d at 117. Rather, the Utah appellate courts have looked
to neighboring states for their interpretations. The Arizona
Supreme Court, in interpreting a rule similar to section 77-8a1, held that: "in order for two crimes to be classified as a
common plan or scheme it is not necessary for the crimes to have
been perpetrated in an absolutely identical manner, so long as
the court perceives a visual connection between the two crimes."
State v. Tipton, 119 Ariz. 386, 581 P.2d 231 (Ariz. 1978). The
Lee court also cited cases from Idaho and Missouri, both of
which allowed joinder of two or more claims where both counts in
the indictment referred to the same type of offense, even where
the time periods for commission of the separate offenses were
months apart. See State v. Warren, 717 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App.

1986); see also State v. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830 (Idaho
1984). In Lee, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's conclusion that the alleged crimes were part of a ''common scheme or plan.'7 The Lee court stated, "The parallel fact
pattern in both incidents plainly demonstrates the existence of
a calculated plan.
Later, in State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997),
the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to
deny a defendant's motion to sever charges. The defendant had
been charged with murder and theft. The Scales court stated
that "to determine whether the trial court complied with section
77-8a-l, we must interpret it according to the common meaning of
its plain language." Scales, 946 P.2d at 384-85. The court
then indicated that "the language of section 77-8a-l is clear."
Id. The Scales court was convinced that the murder and theft
charges were part of a common scheme or plan, the thefts facilitating flight from the murder scene.
Therefore, under the plain language of the statute and supporting case law, the statutory requirements for joinder of the
charges appear to have been met. However, the same statute continues by stating:
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the
court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide
other relief as justice requires.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (4) (a) (2006). This section requires
the Court to determine whether the parties (either the State or
the Defendant) would be prejudiced by joinder of the offenses,
and if prejudice results, the court is to take appropriate action. "The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is
prejudiced by joinder is whether evidence of the other crime
would have been admissible m a separate trial." State v. Mead,
2001 UT 58, 1159 (internal quotations omitted) . In Lee, the Utah
Court of Appeals, m addressing this very question, stated that

in order to determine whether evidence of one [count] would
be admissible at a separate trial on the other count, we
look to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That
rule provides: ^Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.'
In the case before the Court, evidence of one count would be admissible at a separate trial on the other count for purposes of
establishing motive, intent, absence of mistake, etc. Therefore, the Defendant in this case would not be prejudiced by
joinder of the various counts since evidence of each count would
be admissible in a trial on either count.
Finally, a relevant issue in both counts will be the income
and expenses of the Defendant during the applicable periods of
time. Because the time periods for each count overlap substantially, Mr. Horrock's obligations and payments to one former
spouse would be admissible in establishing the ability to pay
his obligations to the other former spouse.
The requirements for joinder are met and there does not appear to be prejudice to the Defendant. For these reasons, the
Court hereby denies the Defendant's motion to sever.
Dated this

lfyi'%^,

day of

, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

A.

My

LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

